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I – Concepts 
The notion of self-respect appears in many literary works as well as in real life. Here is a literary 
example cited by Robin Dillon (2004, 47) from George Bernard Shaw’s play Mrs. Warren’s 
Profession (1894): 
 
“When her daughter, Vivie, challenges Mrs. Warren’s life in the world’s oldest 
profession, Mrs. Warren defends her path as better than the “respectable” options that 
were open to her as a poor girl: working as a scullery maid or scrubbing floors for a few 
shillings a week “with nothing to look forward to but the workhouse infirmary,” working 
in the factory until she died of lead poisoning, or marrying a laborer, who’d likely turn 
to drink, and struggling to feed his children. These options were, she insists, not just 
more miserable than the path she chose but morally worse: “How could you keep your 
self-respect in such starvation and slavery? And what’s a woman worth? What’s life 
worth? Without self-respect!” 
 
Of course, we don’t have to agree with Mrs. Warren regarding her work as a prostitute. For one, 
her daughter, Vivie, doesn’t agree, nor do many others including Dillon herself (she brings 
further examples that disagree with Mrs. Warren). Still, Mrs Warren does not use misuse the 
concept of self-respect and this is what is important for us. For, it helps us understand what 
‘self-respect’ exactly stands for in our thinking and emotional life.  
Here is how Dillon (2013, 4776) defines self-respect: “Self-respect is an appropriate and 
engaged appreciation from a moral point of view on oneself as having morally significant 
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worth…self-respect is due respect for oneself, proper regard for one’s dignity; to say that a 
person respects herself is to say that her self-regard is morally appropriate.” Self-respect is thus 
a moral notion, a self-reflective moral attitude that is also evaluative in nature. But exactly what 
form does this evaluation take? What is it that we evaluate and how? Here, we find an important 
distinction that permeates the philosophical literature on the notion (Darwall 1977).  
Recognition self-respect involves an “understanding of oneself as having intrinsic worth 
and moral status just in virtue of being a person, and of the moral constraints that personhood 
entails” (Dillon 2001, 66). In short, this kind of self-respect focuses our self-worth on our 
identity as persons. It is a complicated matter, though, what makes us persons. Personhood has 
intrinsic worth, at least in the Western tradition, in virtue of three features: equality, agency, 
and individuality. We are morally equal and thus demand equal moral recognition: we are 
persons of equal dignity and we resent it when this dignity is violated. The other aspects of 
personhood concern manifesting this dignity by living in a way that respects the norms that 
arise from one’s worth as a person. Thereby we avoid a certain form of shame arising from the 
fact “that one’s worth and identity are threatened by failure (real or apparent) to live up to one’s 
standards and expectations as a person (agent, individual).”      
While recognition self-respect focuses our self-worth on our identity as persons, 
evaluative self-respect does the same with regard to our character. This stance consists in a 
certain normative self-conception and evaluative self-respect expresses our confidence in our 
merit based on this self-conception. “Evaluative self-respect contains the judgment that one is 
or is becoming the kind of person one thinks one should be or wants to be, or more significantly, 
that one is not or is not in danger of becoming the sort of person one thinks one should not be 
or wants not to be” (Ibid. 67).  
Many would consider this an overly broad account of evaluative self-respect, however; 
one that would identify this form of self-respect with self-esteem: a feeling of self-worth, a 
positive form of self-appraisal rooted in the perceived excellences of one’s person. Importantly, 
though, self-esteem is much a thinner and non-moral notion when compared to evaluative self-
respect. Take the following – all too familiar - example (Dillon 2004, 61): 
 
“Consider, for example, someone who has a favorable attitude toward himself based on 
having amassed great wealth and power through business deals that involved bribery, 
fraud, brutal elimination of rivals, and other manifestly immoral activities. It is easy to 
see this as someone who values winning and having the guts to get what he wants and 
 3 
thinks he deserves, who thinks that scrupulous people are just sapless suckers and 
wimps, and who esteems himself for living powerfully and profitably.”  
 
Without a doubt we can say that self-esteem manifests itself in this case in the form of pride. 
We might think this pride is misconceived; but we would hardly question the fact of feeling of 
self-worth. But would we also say that this person has self-respect? That he can hold his head 
high, that he lives a worthy life, a life worthy of a person with dignity? Most probably not. And 
this is because evaluative self-respect is grounded not merely in any odd normative self-
conception, but in a moral ideal: in the norms that are entailed by our worth as persons. That is, 
evaluative self-respect builds on recognition self-respect. Those who have the latter strive to 
live by these moral norms; those who have the former strive to become the kind of person who 
lives by such norms. Unlike the billionaire in our example, Mrs. Warren is one of those persons: 
She chooses to be a prostitute because she thinks that other alternatives are degrading for her 
as a person (a judgment that, as noted, can be doubted) and while she is no doubt proud of 
herself for what she has achieved (to provide a good life for her daughter), her positive self-
appraisal goes beyond this: she thinks she has lived a worthy life, a life of dignity and integrity. 
She has, she thinks, no reason to feel ashamed, to feel self-contempt or self-loathing – emotions 
we can associate with the lack of evaluative self-respect. 
Recently, some have argued that the above distinction is not enough to fully characterize 
the importance and depth of self-respect in our mental economy. In particular, they point out 
that there is a deeper level that underlies both kinds of self-respect above. Robin Dillon coins 
the term basal self-respect to refer to this phenomenon (Dillon 1997, 241). Basal self-respect is 
crucial: at its heart is “our most profound valuing of ourselves”. As Dillon puts it, “Whereas 
recognition self-respect expresses, “I matter because I am a person”, and evaluative self-respect 
expresses, “I matter because I have merit”, basal self-respect expresses simply, “I matter”” 
(Dillon 2001, 68 n. 45). If our basal self-respect is secure and positive, we have faith in 
ourselves, we have confidence in ourselves, we are secure of our worth. But when it is damaged, 
“basal valuing is incessant whispering below the threshold of awareness: “you’re not good 
enough, you’re nothing”” (Dillon 1997, 242). Since this is the base, when it is gone or is just 
partially eradicated, the effects are psychologically even morally debilitating: such a person 
experientially understands herself as (near) nothing, as (near) worthless. “Damaged basal self-
respect”, writes Dillon, “creates a damaged self” (Ib. 243).  
Here is an example; an instance of what is often called impostor syndrome (Bortolan 
2018, 62-3 quoting McElwee and Yurak 2010, 188–89): 
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“my program/major is perceived to be ‘the best’ with the highest-quality students 
enrolled in it. On numerous occasions, the girls in my program constitution. have been 
told we’re ‘so bright and outstanding’ by professors, advisors, etc. Many feel only the 
brightest students make it into the program and by being here, it proves our intelligence 
and character. They assume we’re all responsible, organized, hard-working, dedicated 
students. However, that’s not the case... I felt ashamed. I was with 2 dozen girls who 
were bright and great people and I felt like I didn’t measure up to them. Like I shouldn’t 
be here and I’m probably wasting somebody’s time.” 
 
Of course, the student in the example could be right: that she in fact doesn’t ‘measure up’ to the 
other students, that it is a mere fluke, or worse, cheating that she is in the programme. But as a 
matter of fact, this is not the case. The student did not get into the programme as a result of 
cheating or of some kind of accident. She is there because she deserves to be there and, deep 
down, perhaps she also knows this. Then we have a complex emotional syndrome on our hands 
(see Dillon 1997 232-3 for more worked out, albeit artificial examples). For, in this case, the 
student has all the reason to respect as well as to esteem herself; still, she is incapable of this. 
She might even feel shame at what she considers to be her failure to not be proud of her 
achievements (getting into the programme and staying in it). What is more, this is likely to be 
not an episodic phenomenon for the student: the incongruity between her emotional response 
and her beliefs doesn’t go away; it is “persistent, even recalcitrant, impervious to rational 
criticism, argument, and reconceptualization” (Ibid. 234). What the student is lacking is basal 
self-respect and without it all her thoughts and emotions are built on sand: they have no 
foundations. 
 
II – Theories 
Historically, the most influential theorist to place self-respect in his moral philosophy was the 
German enlightenment philosopher, Immanuel Kant. To do so, Kant used a controversial 
‘device’: duties to self. He argued that we have duties not only to other beings, but also to 
ourselves. In particular, we have a duty to respect our own dignity as rational beings and thus 
we shouldn’t act in ways that abase, degrade, defile, or disavow our rational nature. In short, 
we have a duty of recognition self-respect (Dillon 2018, 49). In his The Metaphysics of Morals 
(1797) Kant argued that many specific duties follow from this general duty: the duty not to 
commit suicide, not to misuse our sexual powers, to avoid drunkenness and other forms of self-
indulgence, the duty not to lie, the duty to avoid self-deception and so on. He also argued that 
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the general duty is basic: without it we cannot have duties to others either. Kant also discusses 
evaluative self-respect as a positive motivational force, especially in his The Critique of 
Practical Reason (1788) and in his Lectures on Ethics (1779). For him this form of self-respect 
appears as a combination of noble pride (in our morally worthy achievements) and humility 
(the realization that we nevertheless fall short of perfect morality) (Dillon 2018, 50).  
Kant focuses on duties to self, but self-respect clearly has an entitlement dimension as 
well: others have also a duty to not act in ways that impede or disrupt one’s development of 
self-respect. In short, we have a right to self-respect. Among contemporary philosophers, the 
American philosopher John Rawls has made this entitlement dimension of self-respect a 
cornerstone of his philosophical system in his A Theory of Justice (1971) and subsequent works. 
According to Rawls, the social bases of self-respect determine both our capacity to pursue our 
conception of the good life as well as our confidence to carry out this pursuit. As Rawls (1971, 
440) puts it: “Without [self-respect] nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have 
value for us, we lack the will to strive for them”. It is not clear whether Rawls understands self-
respect along recognition or evaluative lines; still, his message is clear: the provision of self-
respect becomes a matter of justice and social institutions can be judged on the basis whether 
they sustain self-respect. Rawls primarily uses the appeal to self-respect to argue for an 
extensive system of basic rights and liberties. Recently, many have extended the use of self-
respect to argue for further redistributive policies such as, for example, a universal basic income 
scheme (McKinnon 2003; Schemmel 2019) 
Self-respect also plays an important role in other contemporary theories. In his The 
Decent Society (1996) Avishai Margalit argues that a ‘decent society’ “is one whose institutions 
do not humiliate people, that is, give people good reason to consider their self-respect to be 
injured” (Dillon 2018, 51). Axel Honneth’s influential recognition theory in his The Struggle 
for Recognition (1995) and subsequent works pictures social and moral progress as a ‘struggle 
for recognition’. He distinguishes three stages based on three main forms of mutual recognition. 
The first is universal respect that is unconditional on merits, desert or other particularities; the 
second is love, or care that is similarly unconditional; the third is esteem, which is conditional 
on merits, desert or other particularities. The corresponding attitudes toward the self are 
(recognition) self-respect, self-confidence and self-esteem. These self-relations concern oneself 
“as an autonomous agent who is equal amongst others (self-respect), or as a singular being 
whose needs matter and who needs to be loved (self-confidence), and as a bearer of abilities or 
traits that others can value (self-esteem).” (Laitinen 2015, 59)  
 6 
These are all general, comprehensive theories that are somewhat removed from 
everyday reality. However, starting perhaps with Boxill (1976), self-respect has been used 
directly to theorize about real-world struggles against oppression, or stigmatization against 
different groups of marginalized, vulnerable people via institutions, images and actions. There 
is also a steadily growing feminist literature that aims to re-conceptualize the concept of self-
respect and connect it to the still ongoing suppression of women and, more broadly, gender 
inequality as well as LGBTQ+-related challenges. This part of the literature often brings into 
focus the connection of self-respect to other notions, be they epistemic concerning, for example, 
access to knowledge including self-knowledge or moral, in particular, concerning certain 
virtues and vices related to self-respect (Borgwald 2012; Dillon 2018). Lastly, the concept of 
basal self-respect, as we saw, is used to explicate and analyse important psychological 
phenomena often connected to the struggles of vulnerable, oppressed groups such as the 
impostor syndrome or the battered wife syndrome (e.g., women living in abusive relationships).      
 
III – Higher Education: Challenges and Responses  
From a systemic point of view, there is clear interconnection between self-respect in its various 
forms, and education. The connection, moreover, concerns our entire educational system, hence 
separating out the institutions of higher education is not easy, if not impossible. There are many 
ways of conceiving of the aim of (higher) education. Recently, perhaps three such conceptions 
have been influential (Honneth 2015). On one view, the aim of – especially: higher - education 
is producing and transmitting marketable skills: the focus is on selectivity, individualised 
assessment and the encouragement of competitive behavior. On another view, education – 
starting already at the primary school level - is about developing individual autonomy: to teach 
students to be free and independent, to encourage and habituate them to put forward their own 
ideas and proposals. On a third view, education is democracy-oriented. Here the idea is to look 
at pupils and students as future citizens of a democratic republic: to teach them ways of working 
together, producing knowledge together, via a shared process of learning and problem-solving. 
Students can thus be prepared for their future role of being citizens: to participate in the public 
legitimation of their own choices without fear and shame. Again, this starts already on the 
primary school level: education, on this view, is a process of empowerment and emancipation 
that often takes the form of acquiring practical habits in the earliest stage of upbringing and 
socialization (Jørgensen 2015). 
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The market-based view of education has little space for self-respect and even self-
esteem. After all, the emphasis is on statistically measurable skills and other results and this has 
a positive connection to one’s self-conception only if that shares its evaluative ideal with the 
market, as it were. That is, if students don’t share the prevailing view of market-related 
individual merits (how much one is ‘worth’ on the annual Forbes list), a system that is built 
around this ideal can hardly help them to respect and esteem themselves. Of course, the 
marketized view of education does have a significant role for the ‘student experience’. Since 
students are taken to be consumers who pay for a particular educational service and therefore 
are entitled to expect an educational product in return, significant efforts are made in today’s 
higher education to attract them and then to retain them. One way of doing this is to use 
education to boost their self-esteem: to make them feel good about themselves. However, such 
an instrumental and indiscriminate attempt is likely to turn out to be counterproductive; besides, 
as decades of psychological research shows, making everyone feel good about themselves is no 
panacea to all our social and psychological ills. While no one doubts the motivational force of 
self-esteem and that low self-esteem can cause problems in education (e.g., Mal Ferradás et. al. 
2020), we no longer think that high self-esteem is necessarily good. In fact, there is plenty of 
psychological research that connects it to vulnerability, aggression, violence, prejudice and 
other psychological and social problems (e.g., Baumeister et. al. 2003; Hallsten et. al. 2012). 
The other two models have more place for self-trust (and corresponding self-
confidence), which in turn connects intimately to self-respect as well as to self-esteem. Take 
the second model. Autonomy is a complex and disputed concept. But at least on a procedural 
understanding of it, autonomy requires controlling one’s own life, which in turn requires 
competence in discovering one’s talents, beliefs, and values (Meyers 1995). Of course, there 
are situations when one has reason to question oneself. In fact, we teach our students to be 
critical and questioning and of course this also involves their own views. However, the kind of 
self-trust concerned here is more basic – what it rules out is a sort of fundamental self-doubt: 
“to lack general confidence in one’s own ability to observe and interpret events, to remember 
and recount, to deliberate and act generally…a lack of any sense that one is fundamentally a 
worthy and competent person” (Govier 1993, 108). If one doubts oneself on this fundamental 
level, one cannot function as a person. Without trusting, in this way, one’s own memory, 
interpretation, motivation, one will constantly question one’s own idea of what has happened 
to one and/or to others. Without this form of trust, one is not able to depend on oneself to carry 
through decisions and act on one’s own values in difficult situations.  
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Many phenomena that are much discussed these days connect in here. Gaslighting is a 
form of psychological manipulation in which a person sows seeds of doubt in another person 
regarding their memory, intentions, perceptions and so on. The battered woman syndrome is 
also partially dependent on self-doubt ultimately leading to the conviction, on the woman’s part, 
that she deserves the abuse. And self-doubt is also a core characteristic of the already discussed 
impostor syndrome when one, often a woman, believe that one is not as competent as others 
perceive one to be (one is a phony, as it were). And the list continues.  
In all these cases, the suffering subject entirely lacks or only possesses damaged 
autonomy; this much is clear. It is also clear that the subject possesses no or little self-respect 
and self-esteem. Why is this? The important point is that institutional systems, not only 
individual relations can have such detrimental effects. In fact, even going beyond this, the 
informal organization of society, for example, society’s male-dominated relations, through the 
family and other institutions, can also significantly contribute to making matters worse. And, 
of course, education belongs to these formal and informal structures; hence it is not surprising 
that both aforementioned models of education lay a heavy emphasis on promoting self-trust and 
self-confidence from the early stages of education.  
On the third model, this is also connected to democracy and democratic citizenship. As 
venues of shared learning and problem-solving, schools are miniature democracies on this view; 
universities, as centres of higher learning, are – or should be – even more so. Democracies treat 
people as equals. In addition to freedom, equality is considered standardly to be what makes 
democracy valuable in itself. But this doesn’t only mean interpersonal respect for others as 
equals but also intrapersonal respect – one needs self-respect and self-esteem coupled with or 
based on self-trust to be – and to feel to be - in the position to participate in republican self-
legislation as equal among equals. No wonder that several of the theorists mentioned previously 
– Rawls and Honneth in particular - place self-respect in centre stage in their own moral 
theorizing.  
What does this require in down-to-earth educational terms? Many things can be said 
here. On the organizational level, an increased level of workplace democracy might be 
warranted (Frege, Herzog & Neuhäuser 2019): abolishing, as much as possible, hierarchical 
structures; involving students in decision-making; putting an end to the artificial separation of 
administration and the rest of the university; viewing the university as a community of scholars 
and students. We can also learn a lot from the much-admired Finnish education system. In 
Finnish primary and secondary schools, pupils from different educational background remain 
in the same schools together as long as possible; tests and examinations are reduced to a bare 
 9 
minimum; communicative responsibility and mutual trust are given much greater weight than 
individual attributability; and choices regarding teaching methods are made by the 
professionally trained teachers themselves in cooperation with student representatives 
(Sahlberg 2012).  
Although the context and nature of higher education is different, many of these ideas 
can be implemented at universities and other higher-education institutions. Perhaps even more 
so since higher-education institutions have more means at their disposal: through formal set of 
structures and activities (lecture, seminar, tutorial, workshop, private study, assessed work) 
with a socially loose framework that offers a curious variety of opportunities for intimacy, 
distance, collaboration and isolation, power and transformation, self-respect as well as respect 
for others can be effectively promoted (cf. de Souza & e Souza Placco 2012). This is a process 
of self-other recognition in which one’s intrapersonal recognitional attitude – self-respect, self-
esteem, self-confidence, self-trust – develops through the establishment of interpersonal 
recognition – respect, esteem, confidence, trust. Axel Honneth’s theory builds almost 
exclusively on this process and higher education plays a crucial role in it.  
Digitalization of education is another area where challenges and opportunities co-exist. 
The use of virtual public spheres – discussion forums, digital roundtables, videoconferencing 
and so on – as well as the use of social media can be important means of engagement and 
involvement boosting the participants’ self-respect and self-esteem. But as is well-known from 
everyday life and the media, the dangers of using these products of the ‘digital revolution’ are 
all the more apparent in today’s pandemic-riven, divided world.  
Another challenge is multiculturalism: the heterogeneity of the students in the classroom 
as well as of staff in the institution. Regarding students Honneth (2015, 31-2) takes a positive 
tone: “the less a pupil is treated as an isolated subject meant to deliver a certain performance, 
and the more he or she is approached as a member of a cooperative learning community, the 
more likely is the emergence of forms of communication that allow not only for a playful 
acceptance of cultural differences but that positively conceive of such differences as 
opportunities for mutual enrichment.”  
What are the main dangers from the point of view of self-respect? Stigmatization 
appears to be an obvious candidate: no one should be considered a secondary member, citizen, 
student, staff member just because of who they are (because of any particular individual trait, 
for example). Marginalization is also crucial to avoid: the already existing marginalization in 
society (by skin colour, sex and so on) should not be reinforced and as much as possible should 
be resisted. Vulnerable groups should be protected in educational systems by all means 
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possible. And as is evident from the above, steps have to be taken to boost women’s and other 
marginalized and vulnerable groups’ self-trust and self-confidence.     
 
IV – In Place of a Summary 
In a recent story in The Atlantic (‘The Confidence Gap’), the authors, Katty Kay and Claire 
Shipman, report their research on the surprising phenomenon that many successful women, all 
accomplished and highly competent, exhibit high degrees of self-doubt and self-confidence. 
Their focus is on working professionals, but they also cite examples from education. Here is 
one:  
 
“David Dunning, the Cornell psychologist, offered the following case in point: In 
Cornell’s math Ph.D. program, he’s observed, there’s a particular course during which 
the going inevitably gets tough. Dunning has noticed that male students typically 
recognize the hurdle for what it is, and respond to their lower grades by saying, “Wow, 
this is a tough class.” That’s what’s known as external attribution, and in a situation like 
this, it’s usually a healthy sign of resilience. Women tend to respond differently. When 
the course gets hard, Dunning told us, their reaction is more likely to be “You see, I 
knew I wasn’t good enough.” That’s internal attribution, and it can be debilitating.” 
 
Kay and Shipman then ask the question: where does it all start? On the ‘nurture’ side, they focus 
on three formative places: the elementary-school classroom, the playground, and the sports 
field. They are no doubt right about this. However, higher education is also an important factor. 
Although, by its nature, it is certainly not where the negative processes begin, it is undoubtedly 
one of the major venues where they continue and, potentially, gather further force.  
 Kay and Shipman then go on to propose ways of reducing the confidence gap. They 
claim that “Confidence is not, as we once believed, just feeling good about yourself”. This is a 
reference to the once central role self-esteem had been believed to play in this area. And, of 
course, they are right about this: I have noted this myself. But then they claim that action is the 
crucial factor: “So confidence accumulates – through hard work, through success, and even 
through failure.” But if what I have written has any grain of truth to it, the problem is nowhere 
near this simple. For, why someone lacking confidence would ever act and thus accumulate 
confidence? Self-confidence and self-trust are multifaceted phenomena. They relate not just to 
self-esteem (the arguably most superficial level), but to the three kinds of self-respect I’ve 
distinguished at the start of this entry. Institutional systems, including those of higher education, 
 11 
must be clear on which of these layers they are best placed to target before they devise methods 
of reducing the confidence gap. In general, as demonstrated, higher education has an important 
role in empowering the development of self-respect in our societies. 
 
V. Suggested reading 
The literature on self-esteem is dominated by psychological research; the literature on self-
respect is almost entirely philosophical. With this in mind, here are some recommendations for 
further reading. 
 
More on self-respect: 
Dillon, R. S. (ed.) (1995), Dignity, Character and Self-respect, New York: Routledge. 
Massey, S. J. (1983), ‘Is Self-respect a Moral or a Psychological Concept?’, Ethics 93: 246-
261. Reprinted in Dillon 1995, pp. 198-218. 
Roland, E.R. and R.M. Foxx (2003), ‘Self-Respect: A Neglected Concept’, Philosophical 
Psychology 16 (2): 247-287. 
Statman, D. (2000), ‘Humiliation, Dignity, and Self-Respect’, Philosophical Psychology 13: 
523-540. 
 
On the difference between self-respect and self-esteem: 
Grace, H.A. (1953), ‘The Self and Self-Acceptance’, Educational Theory 3: 220-235. 
Sachs, D. (1981), ‘How To Distinguish Self-respect from Self-esteem’, Philosophy and Public 
Affairs 10: 346-360. 
 
On the connection between self-esteem and education: 
Ferkany, M. (2008), ‘The Educational Importance of Self-Esteem’, Journal of Philosophy of 
Education 42: 119-132. 
 
On the connection between self-respect and education: 
Kramer, M.H. (1998), ‘Self-Respect, Megalopsychia, and Moral Education’, Journal of Moral 
Education 27:5-17. 
Strike, K. (1980), ‘Education, Justice, and Self-Respect: A School for Rodney Dangerfield’, 
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Worsfold, V.L. (1988), ‘Educating for Self-Respect’, Philosophy of Education 44: 258-269. 
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